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I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) stands at the brink of a major decision about its
political future-in what has been described as an Ackermanian constitutional
moment in its history'--conceming whether it will enact a European
* European University Institute, Florence. Thanks are due to Neil Walker and Bruno de
Witte for their helpful advice and comments. This text was delivered as the annual John
Randolph Tucker Lecture at Washington and Lee University School of Law in October 2003.
1. See generally Neil Walker, After the Constitutional Moment, forthcoming, in THE
DRAFr CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (I. Pernice ed., 2004) (drawing on a body of Bruce Ackerman's
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Constitution. Over the past two years, the EU has spent a great deal of political
energy debating and designing proposals for such a constitutional document.
During the Intergovemmental Conference that will take place in late 2003 and
early 2004, Europe's political leaders will decide collectively whether to
endorse and recommend a final version of this document and will decide
individually whether to consign it to a popular vote or other form of national
ratification. Comparisons (both favorable and unfavorable) with the
Philadelphia Convention and the adoption of the United States Constitution in
1787 abound.2 How is it that this apparently Madisonian moment has come
about after more than fifty years of gradualist and incremental project-driven
integration?
This Article explores some of the different reasons and objectives that
proponents have forwarded for adopting an EU constitution, and examines the
results contained in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as
presented by the Convention on the Future of Europe in July 2003, 3 to see
which, if any, of these objectives that the text achieves. My argument is that of
the many objectives that proponents suggested, there are essentially two
primary, competing reasons that explain the decision to adopt a constitution.
Although the political rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the Convention
and the drafting of a constitution focused primarily on one of these objectives,
the process has in fact produced a text whose main achievement is the other.
work, beginning with his article Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453
(1989)); see also JOHAN P. OLSEN, COPING WITH CONFLICT AT CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS I
(ARENA Working Paper WP 02/23, June 6, 2002) (providing a more skeptical view of whether
the EU is indeed confronting a constitutional moment), at http://www.arena.uio.no
/publications/wp02_23.dwt (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see generally
Dario Castiglione, Reflections on Europe's Constitutional Moment, Presentation for the CIDEL
Conference on Deliberative Constitutional Policies in the EU, (offering "reflections on the
present round of Europe's constitutionalization process"), at http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel
/workshopZaragoza/Dario.pdf (June 22, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. See generally Michel Rosenfeld, The European Convention and Constitution-Making
in Philadelphia, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 373 (2003) (discussing uncertainties about the European
constitutional process).
3. For the website of the Convention, which contains virtually all of the documentation,
speeches, accounts of meetings, and other information relating to the establishment and
functioning of this body, see http://european-convention.eu.int. See also generally K. Lenaerts
& M. Desomer, New Models of Constitution-Making in Europe: The Quest For Legitimacy, 39
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1217, 1234-52 (2002) (discussing methods for drafting a constitution
with concern for legitimacy); Jo Shaw, What's in a Convention? Process and Substance in the
Project of Constitution-Building, Institute for Advanced Studies (discussing the Convention on
the Future of the Union within the context of the larger constitution building process), at
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_89.pdf (June 2003) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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More specifically, the rationale commentators most often articulate for the need
for a European Constitution, and that on which the discourse of the participants
in the Convention process mainly focused, was the internal legitimacy of the
EU-the problems of democracy, decisionmaking, 'closeness to the citizen,'
and the balance of power between the EU, the states, and their regions.
However, the final text produced by the Convention is less concerned with
addressing its internal crises and displays a much stronger orientation towards
the outside world, particularly with strengthening Europe's international
identity, unity and global role.
II. The Emergence of a Constitutional Debate
The EU is an economic and political organization that has been in
existence, albeit in changing form, forjust over fifty years. During that time it
has ex anded geographically from six to (soon-to-be) twenty-five member
states, it has deepened its level of economic integration with the establishment
of economic and monetary union and a single currency, it has expanded into
many new fields such as social, environmental and immigration policy, and it is
gradually developing a capacity in political and foreign affairs. Yet, during
these five decades, apart from within the specialized world of lawyers, who
from the 1980s on have frequently analyzed the emergence and evolution of the
European entity as a process of "constitutionalization,"5 the idea of a European
Constitution was not a politically viable subject.6 Indeed, what lawyers meant
4. See ENLARGEMENT, THE ENLARGEMENT WEBSITE (discussing the scheduled expansion
of the EU on May 1, 2004), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-27 (1981) (analyzing the Court of Justice cases in which "constitutional law
was made"); Giuseppe Frederico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 595, 596-614 (1989) (discussing the effort of the Court of Justice to
advance the constitution-making process); see generally Giuseppe Frederico Mancini,
DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000) (providing a more
general discussion of Europe's constitutionalization process); JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999) (same). The two key earlier cases in which the European
Court of Justice referred to the EC treaties as a constitutional charter are Case 294/83, Parti
tcologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, E.C.R. 1339, [1985-1986 Transfer Binds]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,317 (1986), and Case 1/91, Opinion Delivered Pursuant to
Second Subparagraph of Article 288(1) of the Treaty, E.C.R. 1-6079 (1991).
6. The idea of a European Constitution had inspired several of the reform proposals put
forward by various comitis des sages and by the European Parliament but never gained any kind
of popular political acceptance until very recently. See, e.g., Draft Treaty Establishing the
European Union, 1984 O.J. (C77) 33 (1984) (establishing the European Union).
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by "constitutionalization" referred primarily to the process by which the
European Court of Justice over time deemed provisions of an international
treaty (the original EEC Treaty) to take primacy over national laws (the
supremacy principle) and by which that court declared that provisions of the
treaty could be directly invoked by individuals in their national and local courts
(the principle of direct effect).7 No European political leader made any serious
mention of the term 'constitution' until the surprising eruption in 2000 of an
open debate, led by the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer,8 about the
desirability or otherwise of a constitution for the EU, with virtually all of the
major heads of state or government and many foreign ministers and leading
political figures intervening to make a contribution to the debate.
9
Why is it that the EU, which has been developing for over five decades in
an incremental way through what some have dubbed a process of serial
constitutionalism, is suddenly in the throes of a high profile, political, and
explicitly constitutional debate? What is it that has made the notion of a
constitution for Europe politically palatable for the first time? And, why is the
EU seriously debating the adoption of a constitution? For some, this is a truly
Madisonian moment for Europe;I the appropriate moment to recognize and
instantiate a true European political community, 12 to mark the coming to
7. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, E.C.R. 585 (1964) (laying down these
doctrines); Case 26/62, NV. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Ondememing van Gend en Loos
v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, E.C.R. 1 (1963) (same).
8. See Symposium: What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity: Responses to
Joschka Fischer, NYU School of Law, Jean Monnet Center (providing the text of the Fischer
speech and a collection of essays responding to his arguments), at http://www.jeanmonnet
program.org/papers/00/symp.html (last visited Nov. 16,2007) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
9. See Bridget Laffan, The Future of Europe Debate Part III, Institute of European
Affairs, Ireland (providing a discussion of many of these speeches), at http://www.iiea.com
/futeuro/bltfoed.pdf (2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See generally Walker, supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., FEDERAL UNION, SHOULD THERE BE A REFERENDUM ON THE EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION?, (Sept. 10, 2003) (advocating the need for a European constitution to determine
whether a referendum should occur), at http://www.federalunion.org.uk/europe/referendum.
shtml (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); YOUNG EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS, ICG
MEMBERS-DON'T TOUCH THE CONVENTION'S CONSTITUTION (March 10, 2003) (asserting that
European governments should support the Constitution), at http://www.jef-europe.net
/presscentre/archives/00 1721 .html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Jtlrgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, II NEW LEFT REv. 5, 5-6
(Sept./Oct. 2001) (distinguishing the 18th century United States constitutional debate by
referring to Europe's need to consolidate and maintain its achievements and the achievements of
two centuries of democracy, rather than imagining a new and unprecedented project); see
generally LARRY SIEDENTOP, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (Penguin Books 2000) (contrasting the
energy and imagination that inspired the drafting of the American constitution with the absence
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maturity of a polity which is inwardly harmonious and outwardly united. Yet,
for others-as the active public and media debate over the last two years has
demonstrated-it is an entirely misguided project, representing at best a
premature attempt to force the pace of integration on an uncomprehending and
alienated public, and representing at worst the buttressing and entrenchment on
a continent-wide scale of either (depending on the political perspective of the
observer) a democratically and socially impoverished model of government
committed primarily to neo-liberal economic expansion, 13 or of an
interventionist socialist European superstate committed to eroding the
independence, liberty, and vitality of the nation states.
14
I will begin by outlining the complexity of the current European
constitutional debate, a complexity that is evident in the many different and
sometimes conflicting reasons proponents articulate for adopting an EU
constitution and which is also evident in the continuing equivocation over the
use of the term "constitution" for the document that policymakers drafted.
What has come across during the process is the impression that relatively few
bold and unambiguous claims have been made, that there has been no clear
consensus, that there has been a great deal of nuance in the reasons put forward
for and against the adoption of a constitution and in the types of instrument or
text which are thought to be appropriate to the task, and that there is a multitude
of actors with very different interests and ideas about the desirable future of
European integration. Yet, these diverse views, actors and arguments have
nonetheless engaged in a process of debate and draffing, the very existence and
functioning of which some will see as a major achievement in itself.
of vision in Europe). It should be noted that Siedentop wrote this book before the heated
constitutional debate fully erupted in the EU from 2000 onwards.
13. See Dorothee Bohle, The Ties That Bind the New Europe: Neoliberal Restructuring
and Transnational Actors in the Deepening and Widening of the European Union, ECPR Joint
Session Workshops, Workshop 4: "Enlargement and European Governance" (arguing that the
EU is a neoliberal project), at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive
/turin/ws4/Bohle.pdf (March 27, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
More generally, many of the citizen initiatives gathered within the European Social Forum argue
that the European project, including the constitutional convention, is pursuing a neoliberal
agenda. See, e.g., EUROPEAN SOCIAL FORUM CALL OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION
FOR THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FORUM (Nov. 12, 2002) (opposing a "European order based on
corporate power and neoliberalism"), at http://www.mobilise.org.uk/view/ESF/AboutWsfCall
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Pat Buchanan, American Patriots Battle to Retain USA's Character, Address
(Aug. 21, 2002), ("Across the Atlantic, ancient states are yielding control of their frontiers,
money and defense to a socialist superstate."), at http://www.buchanan.org/pa-00-0821-
patriots.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Further, one can see the complexity and ambiguity of the whole process
reflected well in the fastidiousness over the use of the core term "constitution."
While many observers and participants speak of the drafting of an EU
constitution, the official political discourse has certainly not settled on this
term, and the language the drafters used in the legal texts and drafts has varied
so far. The Laeken European Council Summit, which first established the
Convention, used the term "constitutional text" (albeit alongside
"Constitution"). 15 Many of the participants within the Convention itself used
the more unequivocal language of"constitution." Convention President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing suggested the term 'constitutional treaty' in his opening
address to the Convention. 16  Finally, the term "treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe" appeared in the final text produced by the Convention
in July 2003-an interesting compromise and perhaps the most prevalent term
today.'7 Subsequently, the October 6, 2003 declaration of the heads of state
and government at the opening of the Intergovernmental Conference used the
terms "constitutional text" and "constitutional treaty," but not the unambiguous
term "constitution." 18
III. Why Enact a European Constitution?
At this moment in time, commentators have identified and articulated a
number of different reasons for the perceived desirability of a constitution for
Europe. 19 These are not merely hypothetical objectives that might be served by
15. See LAEKEN DECLARATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION § 11, BELGrUM AT
THE EU CONVENTION (last visited Jan. 3, 2004) (employing the term "constitutional text"), at
http://www.euconvention.be/static/LaekenDeclaration.asp (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
16. See President v. Giscard d'Estaing, Introductory Speech to the Convention on the
Future of Europe, Address to the Convention of the Future of Europe (Feb. 26,2002) ("In order
to avoid any disagreement over semantics, let us agree now to call it: a 'constitutional treaty for
Europe."'), at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/l.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European
Union (C 169) 1 (2003) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
18. See DECLARATION OF ROME, CONFERENCE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES (Oct. 6. 2003) (declaring the Conference's support of a
constitutional text), at http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00003.en03.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF ROME].
19. See Andreas Follesdal, Drafting a European Constitution: Challenges and
Opportunities, CONSTITUTIONALISM WEB PAPERS, ConWEB No. 4 at 3-9 (discussing a
somewhat different set of arguments for and against a European Constitution), at http://www.
les I.man.ac.uk/conweb/papers/conweb4-2002.pdf (2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee
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the enactment of a constitution, but also views and positions that were actually
expressed by many of the relevant actors in the course of the debate and the
Convention process. The reasons and objectives of the proposed enactment of
the United States Constitution were relatively small in number and well-
defined. The reasons of why a new United States Constitution was necessary to
replace the existing Articles of Confederation were presented and argued. They
included primarily the enhancement of external security and unity and the
prevention of internal political and commercial dissent from weakening the
cohesiveness of the states. Conversely, the EU citizens have identified and
expressed a range of widely differing reasons for enacting a constitution.
A. Enhancing Legitimacy
The first, and in some ways the most general, reason for a European
constitution is that of enhancing the legitimacy of the European Union. The EU
has experienced something of a legitimacy crisis since the "grand moment" of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which moved the previous "economic community"
onto the legal footing of a "European Union" with explicitly political connotations
and aims, and greatly expanded the ambitions and powers of the entity including
the institution of economic and monetary union.2 ° Commentators generally view
that time to have signaled the end of the "permissive consensus"'21 that
characterized the first three decades of European integration and allegedly relied
on the passive consent of the governed who did not actively object to their
governments having created a common market and having ceded certain
significant functions to the EEC in the interests of enhanced trade and economic
welfare. Scholars now perceive the post-Maastricht era to have coincided with
the growth and increasing expression of vocal public opposition to the European
integration process. The political elites most acutely felt this opposition in the
shape of several popular referenda: the initial Danish no-vote to the Maastricht
Law Review).
20. See Gr~inne de Burca, The Questfor Legitimacy in the European Union, 59 MOD L.
REV. 349, 349 (1996) (suggesting that the legitimacy crises came into focus after the Maastrict
Treaty); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fin de Sikcle Europe in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER
CLOSER UNION?, 203, 204 (Renaud R. Dehousse ed., 1994) (stating that after the Maastrict
Treaty, "'Europe' is an ideal which lost its mobilizing force, it is a force which has lost its
mobilizing ideals").
21. See generally LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A. SCHENGOLD, EUROPE'S WOULD-BE
POLITY PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1970) (using the term "permissive
consensus").
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Treaty; 22 the very narrow margin by which the same Treaty was accepted in
the French referendum;23 the more recent rejection of the Nice Treaty by
referendum in Ireland;24 and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in the Swedes'
rejection of the Euro in their national referendum.25 While there had long
been a discussion among academics and policy analysts about the apparent
'democratic deficit' of the European Community after 1992, the starker
reality of this repeated pattern of popular rejection, which arose whenever an
opportunity for direct public input through referendum arose, highlighted
sharply the precariousness of what the political elite had previously taken for
granted as a stable economic and political community firmly fixed on the
road to ever closer integration. As a consequence, and given their increasing
awareness of what was at stake, there was evidence throughout the 1990s of
EU leaders and officials seeking ever more determinedly for ways to win over
the public and to bring Europe closer to its citizens. Evidence of this effort
includes the introduction of a formal concept of European Union citizenship
in the Treaty on EU,26 the drafting of a showcase "Charter of Rights, 27 a
22. See Editorial Comments, The Danish Referendum, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 855,
855-59 (1992) (discussing the possible reasons for, and implications of, the Danish no-vote).
23. See Byron Criddle, The French Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, September
1992, 46 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 228, 228 (1993) ("On September 20th, 1992 the French
electorate voted by 5 1 % to 49% to ratify the (Maastricht] treaty enlarging the powers of the
European Community.").
24. See generally Richard Sinnott, Attitudes and Behavior of the Irish Electorate in the
Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice, Millward Brown Irish Marketing Surveys Limited
(discussing the results of a public opinion survey conducted to determine why the Nice Treaty
was rejected by the Irish Electorate), at http://www.euireland.ie/TreatyofNice(2)report.pdf(Feb.
26, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Grhinne de Biirca, Post-Nice or
Anti-Nice: The Debate on Europe's Constitutional Future after Ireland's No Vote, 2
HIBERNIAN L.J. 1, 2 (2001) (stating that after Ireland's no-vote there is "a shared sense- even
for once also amongst the elites that Europe cannot continue without the stronger support and
involvement of the peoples of Europe").
25. This referendum took place on September, 14, 2003 and has been interpreted as a
negative assessment by the Swedish population of EU membership more generally, and not just
as a vote on adopting the Euro.
26. See Articles 17-22 (formerly 8-8e) of the European Constitution Treaty (conferring
citizenship in the union upon member state nationals and granting those citizens the rights
enumerated in the Constitution); see generally SIOTIA O'LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF
COMMUNITY CITZENSHIw: FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZENSHIP (1996)
(discussing EU citizenship).
27. CHARTER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2000 O.J. (C 364);
see FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (last visited Feb. 2, 2004)
(providing archives of the drafting of the Charter), at http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang--en (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also generally Grhinne de B6rca, The
Drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 26 EUR. L. REV. 126 (2001) (examining the
process of drafting the Charter).
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"governance reform" project," and several other initiatives.29 But, it was only
in 2000 and thereafter that EU leaders openly articulated the more ambitious and
far-reaching proposal to adopt a constitution for Europe as a politically plausible
answer to the increasingly evident popular legitimacy deficit.
A constitutional process would achieve such legitimacy primarily through
the mobilization of popular support for the project. In this sense, the very process
of debating, discussing, and eventually adopting a constitution-whatever its
ultimate content-would, due both to its community-galvanizing effects and its
deep symbolic significance, create a greater sense of public identification with,
and ultimately commitment to, the polity. The legitimacy would reside as much
in the process of debating and enacting the constitutional settlement as in its
content, although the latter would obviously also be important. On this view of
the legitimating function of a constitution, the opportunity for some kind of
"citizen baptism" is crucial. Member states should participate in the debate over a
new constitution, and in so doing should engage in the process of identifying with
and approving the new settlement and developing the foundations for
constitutional patriotism.
30
B. Clarification and Consolidation
A second reason for the enactment of a European constitution is the alleged
need for clarification and consolidation of Europe's legal, institutional, and political
28. See European Governance: White Paper from the Commission of the European
Communities, COM(2001)428 (July 25, 2001) (proposing a series of changes aimed at
reforming European governance, including "opening up the policy-making process to get more
people and organizations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy"); see generally
Symposium, Mountain or Molehill?: A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on
Governance, NYU School of Law, Jean Monnet Center (providing a variety of academic
commentaries on the governance reform process), at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org
/papers/01/010601 .html (2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See Ulrich Haltern, Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of
Constitutionalism in the European Imagination, CONSTITUTIONALISM WEB PAPERS, ConWEB
No. 6, 2002, at 6-7 (providing an account of Europe's "stunning lack of social legitimacy"), at
http://www.lesl.man.ac.uk/conweb/papers/conweb6-2002.pdf (2002) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See Carlos Closa, Forging European Constitutional Patriotism: Deliberating on the
Constitution Within the Convention, Paper Delivered at CIDEL Workshop; Deliberative
Constitutional Policies in the EU at 10 (stating that constitutional patriotism will result from
discussions on adherence to values), at http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/workshopZaragoza
/CClosa.pdf (June 20, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see generally
JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996) (developing the theory that in order for
democracy to achieve legitimacy, the persons affected must become engaged in, and approve of,
the relevant discourse).
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framework. Such a process could also, of course, have a popularly legitimating
effect, but that would not be its primary purpose. From this perspective, the
European Union is too labyrinthine, too bureaucratically dense, too complicated,
and opaque a system of governing to be in any way comprehensible to the ordinary
citizen. Thus, the point of adopting a constitution would be to make clearer, simpler
and more transparent the structures of power and the instruments of government-
the "who does what" of the European Union.3 1 The Constitution would articulate
clearly and precisely the powers of the EU and the powers of the states. In this way,
the exercise of adopting a constitution would not aim to bring about major change,
but would really be primarily about streamlining and recording in a more
comprehensible way the EU functions, and to a lesser extent consolidating and fine-
tuning developments which were already well advanced. This process in itself
would enhance the legitimacy of the EU, would render it less of a bureaucratic
monolith to the average referendum-voting citizen, and would secure the stable
future of the Union. The current United Kingdom government has professed itself
to be an adherent to this particular vision of why an EU constitutional settlement is
desirable, with the added goal of increased legitimacy through improved
clarification and transparency. Indeed, this relatively minimalist view of why it is
31. See Thomas Fuller, EU Puzzler: Who Does What?: Power and How to Wield It, at
the Core of Constitutional Clash, INT'L HERALD TRB., June 5, 2003, at 2003 WL 56176693
(quoting Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission as saying that the Draft
Constitution needs to designate "who does what [in a manner that is] easy to grasp for our
fellow citizens").
32. See, e.g., A Constitutional Treaty for the EU. The British Approach to the European
Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, para. 14-7, 42 (outlining the challenges to the current
EU framework and explaining why Britain should support the EU Constitution), at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FoE-IGCPapercm5934_sm,0.pdf (Sept. 2003) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Constitutional Treaty states:
14. This has led to two challenges. First, the EU's framework has become too
complex and unwieldy. Second, now the EU has come to play a more important
role in people's lives, they expect more clarity on its workings.
15. There is no single document to which someone could turn to find out about the
Union's aims and objectives or processes of decisionmaking.
16. The EU needs a clearer statement of what it does, why it does it and how. Its
legal structure should be made easier to understand. And Europe's citizens and
businesses should know what powers national governments have conferred on the
EU, and what powers they have kept for themselves.
17. On the second challenge: the EU now plays a greater role in people's lives.
They therefore expect it to be more responsive to their needs and to listen to their
concerns. So the Union must become more open and better understood. This is the
test of the EU's legitimacy.
42. The Convention's draft meets important British goals:
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appropriate to adopt a constitution for the EU has for some time been one of
the most prevalent and politically acceptable views to articulate. In other
words, this view defines constitutionalization as little more than
consolidation and simplification, 33 where the basic shape of the polity and the
basic rules of the game are put in documentary form and made clear and
accessible to all. It is a perspective that can be somewhat reductively
summarized in the suggestion by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that
the significance of enacting a constitution for the EU need be no more and no
less than the adoption of a constitution by a golf club,34 and thus need not
give rise to any antifederalist or sovereigntist fears.
Although one can easily link the aim of constitution-making in order to
clarify and consolidate the EU's achievements to the second objective
outlined above, that of increasing the legitimacy of the EU, these are
nonetheless distinct aims in other ways. In particular, the objective of
increasing the popular legitimacy of the EU through community mobilization
and citizen involvement in the creation, enactment, and ongoing elaboration
of the Constitution implies a rather different and deeper sense of legitimation
than that of making the EU a more acceptable product through greater clarity
and comprehensibility.
" The draft Treaty consolidates the existing EU Treaties into a single logically
ordered text, which sets out what the EU is, what its objectives are and how it
will strive to achieve them. The text replaces the Maastricht Treaty's three
'pillars" with a single Treaty structure. The draft Treaty streamlines the number
of EU legal instruments.
" The draft Treaty sets out a more transparent and accountable structure for the EU.
It includes a definition of the Union's competences, which makes clear where the
EU can and cannot act. It strengthens the role of national Parliaments through a
new procedure to reinforce subsidiarity, that is, the principle whereby, in policy
areas where competence is shared between the Union and Member States, the
Union should act only when "the objectives of the intended action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States" alone.
33. See Paul Magnette, In the Name of Simplification: Constitutional Rhetoric in the
Convention on the Future of Europe, Paper Delivered at CIDEL Workshop; Deliberative
Constitutional Policies in the EU, at 10 (analyzing the discourse around the Convention
process), at http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/workshopZaragoza/PMagnette.pdf (June 21,2003)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See Straw Calls for EU Constitution, THE GuARDIAN, Aug. 27, 2002 at
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,9061,781293,00.html ("Golf clubs all across Scotland
have constitutions. The point about having a constitution is that it's a clearly understood word
describing the basic rules for the operation of an institution, whether it's a golf club, a political
party or in this case a European Union.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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C. Reining in the EU
A third reason for enacting a constitution for the EU is one that responds
to the concerns of national sovereignty. This reason derives from a liberal
philosophy of constitutionalism and is the objective of limiting and reining in
the powers and functions of the EU. In other words, there are those who see an
advantage in drafting a constitutional text in order to restrain a potentially
overweening EU and to bind it with a set of clear and entrenched constitutive
rules. This vision sees the primary function of a constitutional treaty for the EU
to be that of setting limits to the powers of the center and reinforcing and
restating the powers of the member states, or in some cases, of their regions.
This position has been articulated by some British conservatives and
"Eurosceptics," 35 as well as by certain politicians from the German Lander,
36
and it is a position that the economically liberal Economist magazine has
endorsed. 37 This vision is also one purpose of an EU Constitution that may be
rather different from the consolidation vision, in so far as one could view the
enactment of a constitution as an opportunity to roll back, repatriate, or reduce
the powers of a potential super state. A further variant on this objective is the
35. See, e.g., William Hague, Foreword to the Paper by Timothy Kirkhope: Simplifying
the EU: A Conservative Alternative to the European Constitution, Timothy Kirkhope
Homepage, at 3 ("The draft European Constitution is a case in point. Instead of reinventing
Europe as a dynamic, lightly regulated, democratic and accountable network of nation states, it
has become a vehicle for yet more centralization-and there is always pressure from the top for
yet more integration."), at http://www.leedsne.demon.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2004) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See, e.g., Wolfgang Clements, Minister of the German Land of NordRhein-
Westphalia, Shaping-Not Administering-a New Europe: Allocation of Competences within
the European Union after Nice, Address at the Forum Constitutions Europae of the Walter
Hallstein Institute for European Constitutional Law of Humbolt University, at
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/speech/sp 12020 l_en.htm (Feb. 21, 2001 ) (stating that
"areas of competence should be downgraded or even fully reassigned in the competence system
I have presented in cases when action by the member states or regions is sufficient") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See The European Union's Summit: Towards a Bigger, Simpler Europe, THE
ECONOMIST, December 15, 2001 at 11, 12 ("Those who fear that a constitution would mean a
superstate and with it the end of national independence should calm down. A good constitution
would limit and separate powers as much as it would push the writ of the EU into the nooks and
crannies of national life. It would also make no mention of 'ever closer union' as an
objective.").
38. See Clements, supra note 36 (calling for EU regional policy to be returned, to a
considerable degree, to the Member States and their regions); see also Timothy Kirkhope,
Simplifying the EU: A Conservative Alternative to the European Constitution, Timothy
Kirkhope Homepage (calling for the abolition of the common fisheries policy), at
http://www.leedsne.demon.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2004) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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establishment of a truly neo-liberal economic constitution that sees the primary
mission of the EU as being that of "negative integration"-the removal of
obstacles to trade between states and the consequent promotion of economic
growth-and which removes the danger of a socialist Europe by removing the
EU's powers of distribution and redistribution and reducing its regulatory role
to a minimum.
39
D. Marking the Historic Reuniting of Europe
A fourth reason for choosing to draft a constitutional document for the EU
at this time is to mark the historic reuniting of Europe. Apart from the
obvious symbolism, a more practical dimension of this view about the
desirability of enacting an EU constitution is that the unprecedented size and
heterogeneity of the forthcoming enlargement of membership of the EU
arguably precipitates the need to respond in a way that will guard against the
risks of dilution, fragmentation, or weakening of the past acquis. In other
words, the imminent doubling of the EU's size may make constitutional
entrenchment desirable in order to embed and deepen the basic foundations of
the EU legal and political order. There is both a positive and a negative
dimension to this particular argument in favor of a European constitution. On
the negative side, some may see it as an attempt to write, and as far as possible
entrench, the rules of the game, before the newer and numerous members join
the club and risk influencing it adversely from within. Some have interpreted
Joschka Fischer's 2000 speech in favor of an EU constitution, in which he
mooted the possibility of something like a two-speed or multi-speed Europe,
with a vanguard of states at the inner core, and a periphery of states outside
them not necessarily abiding by all of the same rules and policies, as an
example of the latter.4 1 For many of the candidate states, this prospect of atwo-speed or multispeed Europe would be unwelcome, carrying with it the
39. See generally J. GILLINGHAM, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1950-2003: SUPERSTATE OR
NEW MARKET ECONOMY? (2003) (providing examples of those who share such a vision of
Europe's role).
40. See Draft Treaty, supra note 17, Preamble Recital 3, at 8 ("Believing that reunited
Europe intends to continue along the path of civilization, progress and prosperity."); see also
Neil Walker, Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalism, 9 EUR. L. J. 365,
375-83 (2003) (discussing the relationship between European constitutionalism and the
enlargement process).
41. Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of
European Integration, Address at the Humbolt University, Berlin (May 12, 2000), at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/joschka fischeren.rtf(last visited Jan. 3, 2004)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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implication, not of choice and flexible membership, but rather the likelihood of.... 42
a kind of second-class membership and constitutional status. A more positive
version of this fourth reason for enacting an EU constitution, however, is the
pursuit of an appropriate symbolic and legal recognition of the historical
significance of the reuniting of much of Eastern and Western Europe and an
opportunity to mark it by the "creation" and formal foundation of a continent-
wide political community.
E. Strengthening the EU's Unity, Representation, and Capacity for Action
A fifth reason for adopting an EU constitution is to strengthen the external
unity, representation, and capacity for action of the Union. While this may well
be an objective that could also be achieved by the more traditional means of
international treaty reform along the lines of the numerous EU treaties already
adopted over the decades, the symbolic weight of a Europe united and
constituted as a complete and sovereign political community, and not simply
another internally fractious international organization or loose confederation,
may strengthen considerably the argument for an EU constitution.
There are, once again, a number of different dimensions to this argument.
First is the idea of strengthening the EU's international identity, given the
complexity and fragmented nature of the EC's current international
representation and the lack of clarity for third states and other actors in this
respect. The fact that the EC has an express legal personality and can conclude
agreements, but that the EU has not clearly been accorded such legal
personality even though it has concluded a number of agreements in the name
of the Union,43 is a matter of some confusion. Further, and linked to this
distinction between the 'first pillar' of the EC and the second and third pillars
of the EU, is the fact that there is a range of different European actors with
42. See JAN ZIELONKA, ENLARGEMENT AND THE FINALITY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 5
(Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 7, 2000) (arguing that "the creation of a core group would
undo the greatest benefit of the enlargement project; namely, allowing the less advanced
countries of Eastern Europe to join the most advanced countries of Western Europe on equal
terms"), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/00f080l.rtf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See Council Decision 2001/352/CFSP, 2001 O.J. (L 125) I (2001) (approving, on
behalf of the EU, an agreement between the EU and the Former Yugoslavic Republic of
Macedonia); see also Jaap W. de Zwaan, Legal Personality ofthe European Communities and
the European Union, 30 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT'L L. 75,77 (1999) (stating that the European
Communities have a legal personality because they have been able to enter into several treaties
with third party countries); see generally K. Lenaerts & E. de Smijter, The European Union as
an Actor Under International Law, 19 YBEL 95 (2000).
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apparently overlapping powers in the field of external representation in similar
fields.44  A second dimension is the objective of strengthening the EU's
capacity for unified action and the effectiveness of its international action and
instruments, both in foreign policy and in other external fields.
45
There is also a third and rather more specific aspect (albeit one that has
less readily been articulated by the political elite) of this particular reason for
enacting an EU constitution that relates to the debate on unipolarity versus
multipolarity that has unfolded in recent years.46 This is the objective of
strengthening the EU as a polity in order to counterbalance the global
strength and hegemonic position of the United States,47 and to counter
perceived attempts by the U.S. to "disaggregate" the EU.48 The divisions
over the Iraq war have served to heighten existing positions of this kind, and
there have been notable interventions by public figures and intellectuals on
both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, Robert Kagan's attention-grabbing
44. See Lenaerts & de Smijter, supra note 43, at 31 (stating that there is, for example, a
Commissioner for external relations, a high representative for foreign and security policy, and of
course, the holder of the rotating Presidency of the European Council, all of whom have
arguably overlapping functions).
45. See, e.g., Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Paper Presented to the
Thessaloniki European Council Summit, at 14 ("Greater coherence is needed not only among
the EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states."),
at http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf (June 2003) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
46. See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23, 23 (1990-
1991) (stating that there is not a multipolar world, only a unipolar world with the United States
at its center); Frank Biermann and Hans-Dieter Sohn, Europe and a Multipolar Global
Governance, India and Asia as New Partners, the Development and Peace Foundation, Policy
Paper No. 21, at 2 (arguing that "[i]f Europe wants to make progress towards a multilateral
world order, it needs new allies-in addition to but not necessarily in competition with the
United States of America"), at http://www.glogov.org/publications/pp21 _en.pdf (April 2003)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sarah Hal, Blair: Chirac's World View
"Dangerous," Tum GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2003) (describing a conversation between President
Jaques Chirac of France and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the UK concerning the Iraq war in
which Blair criticized Chirac's vision of a "multipolar" world), at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,944938,00.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
47. See Fraser Cameron & Andrew Moravcsik, Debate: Should the European Union Be
Able to Do Everything That NATO Can?, NATO Review (debating whether the EU should
develop a fuller range of military capabilities independently of NATO), at
http://www.nato.int/docu /review/2003/issue3/english/debate.html (2003) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Javier Solana, High Representative For the CFSP, Atlantic Drift, Trf GuARDIAN,
July 10, 2003 ("The notion that the US would be better served by disaggregating Europe
contradicts generations of American wisdom."), at http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/articles
/76622.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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thesis in his "power and paradise" tract4 9 stimulated responses from
numerous Europeans, including Jtlrgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida,
5 1
who argued for the EU to unite more effectively, to develop a real common
foreign, security, and defense policy, and to provide an alternative by way of
global leadership to that of the United States.5 2 This third dimension of the
objective of "strengthening Europe's international identity" as one of the
reasons for enacting a European constitution has remained, until quite recently,
relatively low-key and was not an explicit aspect of the constitutional debate.
However, it may well be one of the more compelling factors that explains
various aspects of the Draft Constitution which ultimately emerged.
IV. Which Objective(s) Does the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe Serve?
Given the wide range of different reasons-some contradictory and some
overlapping-for seeking to draft and enact a constitution for the EU, and
given the novelty and complexity of the Convention debating and drafting
process and the multiplicity of different actors involved, it seems difficult to
discern a clear picture or to gain a firm analytical grasp on what is occurring.
49. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN
THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003); see Steven Lukes, The Question of Power: Europe Versus
America, 10 CONSTELLATIONS 352, 352-57 (2003) (assessing Kagan's argument that Europeans
and Americans live in different worlds).
50. See generally, Special Issue: The New Transatlantic Tensions and the Kagan
Phenomenon, 4 GERMAN L.J. 863, 863-990 (2003) (commenting on Kagan's analysis) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review), at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com; Special
Issue, 10 CONSTELLATIONS 289, 289-436 (2003) (analyzing Kagan's thesis), at
http//constellations joumal.org (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See Jtargen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, February 15, or What Binds Europeans
Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe, 10
CONSTELLATIONS 291, 293 (2003) (providing a response to Kagan's tract). Habermas and
Derrida state:
At the international level and in the framework of the UN, Europe has to throw its
weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the US. At
global economic summits and in the institutions of the WTO, the World Bank and
the IMF, it should exert its influence in shaping the design for a coming global
domestic policy.
Id.
52. Id; see also Habermas, supra note 12, at 12 (arguing that "we Europeans have a
legitimate interest in getting our voice heard in an international context that is at present
dominated by a vision quite different from ours."). It should be noted that Habermas wrote this
piece prior to September 11, 2001 and before the Iraq war, although the Derrida/Habermas piece
was written afterwards.
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How can the questions-what is the meaning of this proposed EU
Constitution?; what is its political significance?; and what does it imply for
Europe or for the rest of the world?-be answered when there seem to be a
great many different answers depending on which of the purported objectives
for enacting a constitution it is designed to serve. One way to begin is by
asking whether the eventual provisions of the draft constitutional text produced
in July 2003 and debated by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference
achieved one or more of these objectives. Does the agreed upon text achieve a
mixture of several objectives, or is it possible to discern a fundamental thrust
emerging from the complex whole that points to the dominance of one of the
objectives over others?
My argument, having examined the provisions of the new draft
constitutional treaty and the Convention and IGC processes, is that what began
as an exercise to enhance the internal legitimacy of the Union, with a clear
focus on the much-invoked but under-involved and alienated citizen, and
intended to bring this citizen closer to the Union through the constitutional
process, has become an exercise focused on the external rather than internal
domain, and has become preoccupied with enhancing Europe's international
role rather than dealing with the familiar and intractable legitimacy deficit or
with introducing significantly new internal institutional arrangements. Indeed,
in the Declaration issued at the Rome European Council Summit in October
2003, at which the Intergovernmental Conference to decide on the draft
constitution was launched, four of the six recitals make reference to the
international role of the EU, one of which also mentions the need for a "strong
and balanced transatlantic relationship.
53
53. DECLARATION OF ROME, supra note 18, at 2. This reference to the international role of
the EU contrasts with the declaration made at the earlier Thessaloniki summit in June 2003,
where the Convention President first presented the Draft Constitution to the European Council,
in which the first two objectives listed were those of "bringing the Union closer to its citizens"
and "strengthening our Union's democratic character," and only in third, fourth, and fifth place
came the references to the international role of the Union. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
THESSALONIKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS para. 2 (June 19-20, 2003), at
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
In comparison, the relevant part of the Rome Declaration in October 2003 (my emphasis is
added) reads that the heads of state and government and the presidents of the European
Parliament and Commission:
" reaffirm that the process of European integration is our continent's
essential calling as the instrument for a more efficacious international role
for the Union in supporting peace, democracy, prosperity and solidarity in
all member States;
* highlight the fact that the imminent enlargement constitutes a historical
moment which renders the Union richer in terms of identity and culture
and extends the possibility of promoting shared values and of conferring
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One response to the argument this Article makes, of course, would be
that the impression of an externally-focused constitution is more a product of
the changing political rhetoric than of the actual substance and likely effect of
the constitutional document. In other words, during the actual Convention
process, when there were a great many actors involved and many working
groups producing proposals on a whole range of policies, mostly internal,
there was much more of a focus on the legitimacy, clarification, and
consolidation questions. But, once the scene shifted and moved onto the high
political stage of the European Council and the Intergovernmental
Conference, where the foreign ministers and the heads of state and
government were concerned, an inevitable focus outwards and a
preoccupation with Europe's global role was apparent. This apparent
preoccupation does not necessarily say anything about the actual content of
the constitutional text or its concrete achievements.
This Article's argument, however, is based on more than an analysis of
the level of political rhetoric, but also on an examination of the text itself.
From such an examination, the boldest and most notable provisions of the
Draft Constitutional text appear to be those that relate to Europe's external
role. These certainly seem to move in the direction of the fourth objective set
out above, that is, that of highlighting the external identity, role, and
representation of the EU. The changes that focus more on internal EU
reform, by comparison, can at best be said to achieve a degree of
consolidation of the acquis and a certain strengthening of the trend and
direction of previous treaty amendments. They seem unlikely to address in
any serious way the problems of lack of popular support and democratic
weight and authority to Europe's role in world;
" confirm the importance of the commitment to endow the European Union
with a constitutional text based on the equality of its States, people and
citizens that assures the efficacy, consistency, and efficiency of Europe's
role in the world and take up the Convention's Draft Treaty as a good
basis for starting in the Intergovernmental Conference;
* renew the expectation of a conclusion of the constitutional negotiations in
advance of the European Parliament elections in June 2004 in order to
allow European citizens to cast their vote in full awareness of the future
architecture of the Union;
" stress that the adoption of a Constitutional Treaty represents a vital step in
the process aimed at making Europe more cohesive, more transparent and
democratic, more efficient and closer to its citizens, inspired by the will to
promote universal values above all through cooperation with
international multilateral organizations and confirming a strong and
balanced transatlantic relationship.
DECLARATION OF ROME, supra note 18, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
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alienation from the EU. The principal internally-focused and externally-
focused changes introduced by the Draft Constitution are set out below with a
view to substantiating this claim.
A. Internally Focused Changes
These reforms can be grouped into five main categories. A first, and
perhaps the most symbolically significant set of changes, has been the
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which
policymakers drafted in 2000 but deliberately left with an undetermined legal
status until the next Intergovernmental Conference in 2004.54 The drafters
incorporated the Charter into the second part of the Draft Constitutional text,
thus placing it within the main body of the proposed new constitution rather
than relegating it to a protocol or annex.55 At one level, the incorporation of the
Charter of Rights into the "constitution" is a very significant move: a Bill of
Rights is a core component of modem liberal constitutions, and the EU has
never had its own, referring instead to the Council of Europe's Convention on
Human Rights as a source of inspiration. On the other hand, the Charter of
Rights is something of a mixed bag.16 Many of the rights contained in it are
expressed in vague and weak terms." Several of the rights relate to areas in
which the EU has few or no powers of action. Some have deemed many of the
"principles" contained in the Charter to be nonjusticiable, 58 and the general
54. See generally Griinne de Bfirca & J. Aschenbrenner, European Constitutionalism and
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 9 COLUM. J. OF EUR. L. 355 (2003) (summarizing some
of the vast and growing body of literature on the Charter and its place in the constitutional
debate).
55. A second significant and related change was the inclusion in Part I of the
constitutional draft of Article 7(2). See Draft Treaty, art. 7(2), supra note 17, at 9 (declaring
that the EU shall seek accession to the European Convention on Human Rights).
56. See, e.g., Francisco Rubio Llorente, A Charter of Dubious Utility, 3 INT'L J. OF CONsr.
L. 405,426 (2003) (expressing doubt as to whether the charter can "act as the foundation for the
future European Constitution"), at http://www3.oup.co.uk/ijclaw/hdbNolume01/Issue_03
/pdf/010405.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. See CHARTER OF ThE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ART. 37 and 38,
2000 O.J. (C364) at 53 (2000) (providing that merely "a high level of protection" shall be
ensured within other EU policies). Other provisions have been characterized as being of trivial
character. See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ART. 29,
2000 0.J. (C364) (recognizing the right to a free placement service).
58. See Draft Treaty, art. 11-52(5), supra note 17, at 29 (amending the Charter by the
Convention on the Future of Europe). The amendment declared that:
The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions and bodies of the Union, and by
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clauses at the end of the Charter are preoccupied with asserting and ensuring
that it brings about no change whatsoever in the relations between the EU and
the states59 and that it simply restates and consolidates what has been
developing through jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice over the
years.60
A second set of changes in the internal sphere is the listing of categories of
EU powers and competences. This change, again, was a symbolically
important issue because much of the early debate about the need for a
constitutional text had focused on the fears of creeping EU powers, on the
difficulties for states, regions, and citizens to know exactly what the scope of
the EU's powers of action were, and about the need for clarification in this
respect. Indeed, one of the four items on the so-called post-Nice agenda,6'
which predated the decision to establish a Convention with a considerably
broader mandate, was the question of clarification of the powers and
competences of the Union. However, although the first part of the Draft
Constitution now contains a certain systematization, in that it identifies and lists
different categories of competence in Articles 11-17, this act of classification
effects no real change. Certainly the kompetenz-katalog that had been
envisaged by some, or the clearly power-limiting constitution envisaged by
others, has not materialized. It is true that some of the associated changes the
drafters made in relation to the exercise of powers by the EU-in particular the
greater involvement of national parliaments in monitoring compliance by the
EU institutions with the principle of subsidiarity-were clearly designed to
address some of the internal legitimacy and parliamentary democracy concerns,
but this particular mechanism is ultimately a soft and nonradical institutional
acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of
their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognizable only in the
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.).
Id.
59. See Draft Treaty, art. Il-5 I, supra note 17, at 28 (emphasizing that the Draft Treaty
respects the fundamental rights of the member states and grants no new power to the Union).
60. The preamble to the Charter declares that it is necessary to strengthen the fundamental
rights on which the Union is founded "by making those rights more visible in a Charter." Draft
Treaty, pt. II, supra note 17, at 23.
61. See EUROPEAN UNION, DECLARATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE UNION (setting out the
agenda for reform of the EU following the conclusion of the fractious and unsatisfactory
Intergovernmental Conference which took place in 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/futurum
/documents/offtext/declaration en.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2004) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The four items on the post-Nice agenda were the need to delimit the
competences of the EU more precisely, the future status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
simplification of the Treaties, and the role of national parliaments. Id.
574
DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 575
addition to the existing panoply of arrangements, rather than a particularly bold
new provision.62
A third set of changes concerns the extension of qualified majority voting
and of the "co decision" legislative procedure that gives the European
Parliament a more equal say with the Council of Ministers in the lawmaking
process. While one could certainly see this as part of an attempt to address the
concerns of an "effective and democratic government" internally (in the sense
that some see majority voting rather than unanimity as an obviously more
efficient and thus arguably more effective decisionmaking procedure and in that
the co-involvement of the directly elected European parliament strengthens the
parliamentary dimension of democratic legitimacy), the scope of the extension
is not dramatic, and compares with the introduction and gradual extension of
the procedure in the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties. To that extent,
it consolidates a pattern of incremental change, rather than making a dramatic
change of a different constitutional nature. Where the extension of codecision
is perhaps most significant under the Draft Constitution, however, is in relation
to many of the formerly "third pillar" issues of police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters.63 One could argue, however, that the general change in the
attitude of the Member States towards coordination and harmonization of
aspects of criminal law, procedure, and policing following the events of
September 11, 2001 facilitated the introduction of this change, and thus there is
62. Even the decision to grant national parliaments, which have objected to a particular
Commission proposal on the ground of subsidiarity, an ex-post right to bring an action before
the Court of Justice for annulment of the eventual measure adopted, was diluted in Article 7 of
the new draft Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
whose ambiguous language does not make entirely clear whether national parliaments may
themselves lodge an action before the ECJ even without the consent or collaboration of their
government:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to hear actions on grounds of
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in
accordance with the rules laid down in Article 111-270. of the Constitution by
Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf
of their national Parliament or a chamber of it.
DRAFT PROTOCOL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SUBSIDIARITY AND
PROPORTIONALITY, art. 7 (Feb. 27,2003), at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty
/cv00850.enO3.pdf at 231 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See Draft Treaty, ch. IV, tit. III, pt. III, § 4-5, supra note 17, at 60-61 (outlining
measures forjudicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation). The extension of
codecision to the fields of asylum, immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters that are
also aspects of the "area of Freedom, Security and Justice" in Sections 2 and 3 of the same
Chapter was undramatic because it is largely in line with the expectation that this would have
taken place after the expiry of the 5-year transition period introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty
to Title IV of the EC Treaty. Id.
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a link with the perceived need to strengthen and unify internal processes in
order to guard against external threat.
The other notable change that is linked with the change in
decisionmaking procedures is the way in which the EU is to determine
qualified majority voting within the Council with a kind of double-majority
rule combining a majority of member states with three-fifths of the EU's
population overall. 64 Drafters intended this change to simplify, to render
more effective and also more proportionate to population size, the way in
which the EU would calculate voting weight, but rather than answering to
aspects of the internal legitimacy critique, the proposed change has created
considerable political controversy, in part because it departs from the bargain
agreed at the time of the signing of the Nice Treaty and weakens the voice of
medium-sized member states at the expense of the larger states. Similarly,
the proposal in Article 25(3) to reduce the number of voting members of the
Commission has given rise to heated debate and opposition, particularly on
the part of smaller member states. Both of these sets of changes-versions of
which had clearly been anticipated for some years as part of the institutional
changes that would be necessitated by enlargement-have generated dissent
and dissatisfaction, and were amongst the main issues on the agenda of the
Intergovernmental Conference that followed the Convention.
A fourth set of internal changes concerns the abolition of the so-called
"pillar structure" originally introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, whereby
foreign and security policy and policing and criminal cooperation
respectively were governed by two treaty "pillars" of the EU whose
provisions differed from those of the first (supranational) pillar of the
European Community. However, although this change may be a significant
symbolic one in highlighting the conceptual unity of the Union, some critics
note that in practical terms the pillars will continue their existence
"underground, 6 1 in that what distinguished them from the Community pillar,
including the different lawmaking methods, legal effects, and greater degree
of intergovernmentalism, will continue to exist in various respects, even if the
new constitutional treaty brings about a formal institutional unity.
64. See Draft Treaty, art. 24, supra note 17, at 13 (describing the qualified majority);
Article 2 of the Protocol on the Representation of Citizens in the European Parliament and the
Weighting of Votes in the European Council and the Council of Ministers (promulgating rules
for the representation of citizens in the European Parliament and the weighting of votes in the
European Council and the Council of Ministers).
65. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 3, at 22 n.62 (citing Kalypso Nicolaldes) (arguing that the
"pillars" will continue to exist underground).
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A fifth set of changes concerns the simplification of legislative
instruments. This set of changes is mixed and rather technical, although it
may be said to introduce a degree of simplification by reducing the number of
different types of instruments (particularly helpful for lawyers from those
member states, such as France and Belgium, that use a similar classification),
it is difficult to discern the significance and meaning of each of the new
categories.66
Few of these "internally oriented" changes that the Draft Constitution
has introduced-with perhaps the exception of the Charter of Rights, which
one can more readily argue to be a move effectively designed to enhance the
legitimacy of the EU-can realistically serve in a clear or unequivocal way to
advance the objective of strengthening the legitimacy of the Union from the
perspective of its alienated citizens. While they may well move in the
direction of consolidating the past acquis, they do not in any significant way
address the problems of democratic legitimacy that seemed to motivate the
impetus for a constitutional debate at its outset. While a single provision for
a weak form of citizens' legislative initiative was included in Article 46 of
the Draft Constitution, along with some general provisions and exhortations
concerning dialogue with and consultation of civil society,67 the Draft
Constitution makes no provision for citizen participation in the adoption of
the document. Not only is there no provision on a Europe-wide referendum,
as many had hoped, but the method prescribed in Article IV-8 for adopting
the text remains the basic intergovernmental treaty procedure whereby each
state ratifies the document in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements. And, while Article IV-7, which specifies the mechanism for
future amendment, makes provision for the establishment (although not
necessarily in the case of any amendments) of a Convention, this Convention
66. See, e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS, SELECT COMMITrEE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, 12th Report
at 7-8 (March I1, 2003) (finding the new categories and terminology unhelpful), at
http://www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld20203/Idselect/ldeucom/71/71 .pdf(on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See Draft Treaty, art. 42, para. 4, supra note 17, at 20 (providing for a weak form of
citizen's legislative intent). Specifically the provision states:
No less [sic] than one million citizens coming from a significant number of
Member States may invite the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the
purpose of implementing the Constitution. A European law shall determine the
provisions for the specific procedures and conditions required for such a citizens'
initiative.
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will be followed by the traditional Intergovernmental Conference procedure
and individual member state ratification.
B. Externally Focused Changes
Let us turn then to the reforms that most affect the external face of the
Union. There are three principal changes of significance and a number of
lesser, though nonetheless noteworthy, provisions. The key changes are the
express conferral of a single legal personality on the Union,68 the creation of a
foreign minister of the Union, assisted by a diplomatic service 69 to amalgamate
the role of several institutional actors currently responsible for aspects of
external policy, 70 the creation of a more permanent, nonrotating president of the
European Council, 7' and the more general and significant strengthening of the
role of the European Council.72 There are also a number of other changes that,
while perhaps less immediately notable than these, also go clearly in the
direction of enhancing the external role, dimension, and capacity of the Union.
These include the "solidarity clause" in Articles 42 and 111-23 1, 71 which
68. See Draft Treaty, art. 6, supra note 17, at 9 (declaring that "[t]he Union shall have
legal personality").
69. See Draft Treaty, art. 111- 197(3), supra note 17, at 66 (calling this new arrangement
the European External Action Service); see also THE DECLARATION ON THE CREATION OF A
EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, Annex to Draft Treaty, supra note 17, at 99 (noting the
need for a joint service of officials to assist the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs); Steven
Everts & Danial Keohane, The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from
Failure, 45 SURVIVAL 167, 172-73 (2003) (describing the importance of the joint service) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.cer.org.ukpdf/evert
s_keohanesurvival.pdf.
70. See Draft Treaty, art. 27, supra note 17, at 14 (describing the position of the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs); Draft Treaty, art. 20(2), supra note 17, at 12 (describing the
composition of the European Council); Draft Treaty, art. 23(2), supra note 17, at 13 (describing
the duties of the Foreign Affairs Council); Draft Treaty, art. 26(2), supra note 17, at 14
(describing the selection process for European Commissioners, including the new minister for
Foreign Affairs).
71. Draft Treaty, art. 21, supra note 17, at 12.
72. See Draft Treaty, art. 111-159, supra note 17, at 57 (noting that the European Council
is responsible for defining "the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning
within the area of freedom, security, and justice"); Draft Treaty, art. Ill-194, supra note 17, at 66
(describing the European Council's duty to identify the strategic objectives ofthe Union); Draft
Treaty, art. 111-196, supra note 17, at 66 (noting that the European Council will define the
guidelines for foreign and security policy, including defense); see also Draft Treaty, art. 39,
supra note 17, at 17 (outlining the European Council's role in developing foreign security
policy). The breadth of the European Council's general role and decisionmaking power in the
field of external relations as expressed in Article 111-194 is particularly striking.
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although now phrased in terms of solidarity in the event of a natural disaster as
well as against the threat or occurrence of a terrorist attack, clearly carries with
it the implication of internal cohesiveness against external threats, and the
provision for the establishment of a European Armaments, Research and
Military Capabilities Agency in Article I1-212. Finally, Paragraph 4 of Article
3 of the Draft Constitution contains an interesting provision that one might
view as reflecting the third dimension of the fifth objective for enacting a
constitution that this Article suggested above, namely the strengthening of the
EU's external role as a means of providing a counterweight to United States
power.7 4 Article 3, which is otherwise rather bland and vague in its setting out
of the various broad objectives of the Union, suddenly becomes specific in the
fourth paragraph by referring to the commitment to "strict observance and
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the
United Nations Charter."
It is certainly true, however, that one could challenge the apparent
boldness of each of the various changes outlined above on the basis that they
are already weakened in various ways and that key features of the new
provisions remain undefined. For example, some take the view that the curious
combination of being simultaneously vice-president of the Commission and yet
subject to the political mandate of the Council will inevitably compromise the
new foreign minister's role and render the role very difficult to operationalize.
Others surmise that the drafters have downgraded the originally strong vision of
the role of a long-term (five-year) president of the European Council due to
73. See Draft Treaty, art. 42, supra note 17, at 19 (enhancing the dimensions of the Union
with the "solidarity clause"). Article 42 states:
(1) The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a
Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The
Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military
resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) prevent the terrorist threat
in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the
civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at
the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a
Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of
a disaster.
Id.
74. See Draft Treaty, art. 3(4), supra note 17, at 9. The provision states:
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values
and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of
the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade,
eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children's
rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law,
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 555 (2004)
opposition from smaller member states who would prefer to strengthen the
leadership role of the Commission. Further, critics may highlight the failure to
introduce any really significant reform of the decisionmaking processes of the
common foreign and security policy as a failure in the attempt to strengthen the
unity and effectiveness of the EU's international role. One could also argue
that some of the externally-focused changes are simply consolidating trends that
were already developing, such as in the emerging recognition of the legal
personality of the European Union.75
Yet, such arguments underestimate the combined significance of the
several changes and their potential future evolution. In particular, the changes
proposed to the European Council are clearly aimed at giving greater visibility
and a coherent identity to the political leadership of the EU, and they clearly
aim to concentrate power in the hands of the heads of government and state.
The fact that the European Council would also, under the Draft Constitution, be
empowered to make decisions across all areas of EU external relations and not
simply in specified fields such as the former second and third pillars or
economic policy, reflects a considerable reinforcement and strengthening of its
overall role.76 More symbolically, the fact that all of the existing provisions on
external relations that were previously scattered across different parts of the EC
and EU Treaties have been gathered into one section is indicative of the
intention to strengthen the legal coherence and unity of this field. All of the
reforms introduced are aimed at giving greater definition, focus, and unity to
the external representation and identity of the Union in relation to the outside
world and each would bring about a distinctive, even if qualified, change to the
existing situation. And, even the controversial nature of the changes, with the
exception of the relatively consensual move to single legal personality, is
arguably itself indicative of their potential importance.
In sum, the objectives that one could most plausibly view to be served by
the Draft Constitution produced by the Convention are the enhancement and
promotion of its external profile and international role, on the one hand, and the
consolidation of its internal structures and acquis on the other. But, the drafters
have not made much progress at this stage towards the apparently most pressing
of the original aims that motivated the drafting of an EU constitution, namely
the endeavor to address the internal legitimacy deficit of the EU. While few of
75. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that the EU has already concluded
agreements in the name of the Union, despite the fact that the EU does not have official legal
personality).
76. See supra note 72 (providing references to the European Council's strengthened role
in defining the "strategic interests" of the EU in external relations in general and the common
foreign and security policy, and in the area of freedom, security and justice).
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the internally focused reforms set out above are negligible, or without any
constitutional significance, neither do they contribute much-with the possible
exception of the visibility of the Charter of Fundamental Rights-to the
legitimacy-enhancing objective of adopting a constitution. The failure to devise
a way of involving "civil society" within the Convention process, and the
absence of any provisions in the Draft Constitution to provide for a popular role
in the ratification of the new document underscore this argument further. Nor
has the Draft Constitution achieved much in relation to the third objective
outlined above, that of limiting and reining in the EU. While there has been a
consolidation of existing powers, the drafters have not adopted an exhaustive
competence catalogue and have not attempted to reduce or repatriate EU
powers to the member states. The new subsidiarity-monitoring mechanism is
interesting but does not in itself bring about any major change or institutional
limitation. Further, in terms of the fourth objective suggested above, the
focus on enlargement has, perhaps surprisingly, not been very great during
the Convention, even though representatives from the candidate countries
were present and had voice.77
None of this is to say that the Draft Constitution, if it is duly enacted
following a process of public debate and discussion within what should by
then be twenty-five member states, will not come to have the kind of
legitimating effects that cannot currently be discerned or predicted from what
has taken place and been agreed,7" nor that future generations will not see and
understand it as the symbolic moment that marked the reuniting of eastern
and western Europe. What I argue, nevertheless, is that it is undeniable that
the boldest features of the draft treaty, and the weight of significance of the
changes that it has so far introduced, lie in the external domain: in the
conferral of legal personality on the union, in giving greater power and
leadership to the European Council, and in creating a single post for foreign
affairs. More cause for worry, it is arguable that there may in fact be a
tension between these two primary objectives: that is, between that of
enhancing the internal legitimacy of the EU and strengthening its external
role and representation. 9 Consider the effect of strengthening the role of the
77. Although the candidate states had no vote, in the sense that they could not, according
to the mandate given by the Laeken European Council summit to the Convention, prevent a
consensus within the Convention, this seems to have had little effect on their ability to
participate on broadly equal terms with all other representatives within the process.
78. See generally Magnette, supra note 33 (examining the legitimizing effects of the
Convention on the Future of Europe); Walker, supra note I (analyzing the constructivist
potential of the constitutional process, in its epistemic and community mobilization functions,
and making the specific point that the latter may well be a long-term gambit).
79. See Robert Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United
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European Council, for example, which of all the EU actors is the least subject
to the constraints of institutional accountability, to constitutional
requirements of transparency, or to judicial or parliamentary control, and the
enhancement of whose role is very likely to alter and even undermine the
status and power of other European and national institutions.
V. Europe's Madisonian Moment?
Returning finally to the title of this Article, and to the idea of the present
time as Europe's Madisonian moment, are there in fact any real parallels with
the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 as a replacement for the Articles
of Confederation, or do the great differences in historical context and
circumstance render such a comparison entirely inappropriate? According to a
number of influential commentators, the two processes do not bear serious
comparison.80 However, if we leave aside the undeniably great and numerous
differences in context and circumstance and look only in the broadest terms at
the reasons that the key advocates of a U.S. constitution gave in the Federalist
Papers, we see in fact that the emphasis then was placed on two main factors:
first, the need for external security-to which four of the first five Papers are
dedicated-and second, the prevention of internal dissent. While the framers
States, 40 JCMS 743, 751-52 (2003) (making a comparable point). Keohane discusses the
changes in American and European approaches to sovereignty, emphasizing that the more the
United States became focused on the importance of its external sovereignty, the more the need
for internal unity and control-which is certainly not always to the benefit of internal
democratic processes-became apparent. Id.
80. See Habermas, supra note 12, at 5-6 (asserting that Europe's constitutional process
differs from the United States process because Europe is moving away from the concept of a
federal state and the European constitutional movement is not "without historical precedent");
see also Magnette, supra note 33, at 7 (arguing that the parallels between Europe's and the
United States' constitutional process are misconceived). Magnette argues that:
It was however naive to think that the Convention could be "Europe's
Philadelphia." First because, before the Convention, the EU was already much
stronger than the loose American confederation: it was a firm and largely accepted
legal order based on federal principles; it comprised stable and permanent
institutions, some directly elected by citizens; and was based on a intensely
regulated single market and a common currency. Secondly, European states at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, with their long history, strong national
identities, large fiscal resources and redistributive policies, cannot be compared to
the young, weakly populated and recently independent "states" which formed the
American Confederation. Finally, nothing in the present European situation could
create a pressure comparable to the context of military, commercial, political, moral
and religious crisis that had given rise to the Philadelphia process.
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also put forward many other arguments for the "insufficiency of the
confederation to preserve the Union," such as the need to safeguard commerce
and common interests, the importance of protection from external threat and
promotion of internal cohesion were the primary and dominant reasons and
objectives proposed by the framers.8 At first sight these may seem quite
inapposite to the EU, which does not feel under threat from hostile foreign
states (as opposed to its fear of unspecified "terrorist attack") and is not
internally driven by the risk of economic wars. Nonetheless, taking the
different circumstances of history and time into account, it is clearly the case
that much of the political energy directed towards the promotion and
justification of a constitution for the EU at the present time is focused on its
relation to the external world, and in strengthening its perceived internal unity.
Not only is the political rhetoric increasingly concerned with Europe's
international role, but many of the most notable new provisions of the draft
constitution are clearly intended to strengthen the EU's external representation
and identity, to concentrate the power of government in the body responsible
for foreign policy, and, though this goal has only been obliquely admitted in
political discourse, to strengthen the EU as a global actor as a counterbalance to
the power of the United States.
Whether the proposed enactment of a constitution proves instead to be a
"moment of madness," an attempt to force on Europe's national populations a
settlement which presupposes an as yet nonexistent European demos and a
strong degree of citizen identification and political allegiance to the EU, cannot
easily be predicted at least until some of the national ratification processes-
which in some cases will include a popular referendum-on the new
constitutional text take place. The optimistic scenario is that the first of the
four reasons proponents gave for adopting a constitution, namely the aim of
constructing a degree of constitutional commitment and community precisely
through the process of deliberating, debating, and enacting a constitution, will
be borne out over time, even if that prospect remains for now at quite a
distance. Yet, to pursue the more optimistic line of argument, perhaps that
distance is inevitable, given that the community-mobilization potential of a
constitutional process is an ongoing feature that is not frozen and cannot be
measured at the precise moment of adoption of a text, but that may develop and
deepen over time if and when the Constitution becomes a living instrument.
81. See Keohane, supra note 79, at 750 ("America's lack of external sovereignty was a
key reason for the Federalist movement to create a constitution.").
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